A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. 1, p. 646. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Early Military Career 4. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. Hickman, Kennedy. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. He spoke out against banning girls education. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. 5. The battle was over in 22 minutes. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). Media Manipulation. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. That very night, the idea was put to the test. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. 15. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. 4. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 (2021, February 16). Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American The Dollar Bill . This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." 8. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. no isolated event. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. 9/11. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. Congress supported the resolution with Oklahoma City Bombing. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. . Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense 2, pp. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. Hickman, Kennedy. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). . This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. 13. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). Mr. In a conversation with Johnson, McNamara confirmedthis, with a reference to OP-CON 34A,acovert operation against the North Vietnamese. 14. They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. 136-137. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. 3. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. The NSA report is revealing. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam.

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